Author: professor Ljubica Vasic, PhD
Analysts dealing with the Arctic issue have identified six categories that can be determined as potential catalysts for conflict in the Arctic. These categories relate to: the central role of Russia in Arctic access, increased security and environmental risks, what is now referred to as the Arctic as a gray zone, challenges posed by the current management of the Arctic, increased economic and political participation of China in the Arctic, and uncertainty regarding Greenland’s geopolitical future. Analysts have noted three key gaps in governance and have defined potential solutions accordingly. (Center for Global Risk and Security)
Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States — the eight recognized Arctic states have long cooperated in the Arctic region, even when their interests, particularly those between Russia and the US, have conflicted over other matters. The reason is that each state believes it benefits from the current mode of cooperation, which occurs through a set of international, regional, and subregional governance mechanisms. However, conditions in the Arctic are evolving, driven by factors such as climate change, economics, and geopolitics. Therefore, its governance mechanisms must also evolve to mitigate new risks before they potentially escalate into conflict. How should existing governance mechanisms evolve to mitigate these risks? Analysts, including those from the Polar Institute, propose and apply an adaptive approach in four phases to identify potential catalysts of Arctic conflict. These include: identifying, confirming, and prioritizing catalysts that cannot be resolved through existing Arctic governance mechanisms, and identifying potential governance mechanisms that could be developed to mitigate the identified risks. To reduce the risk of cooperation breakdown by 2030, analysts recommend that interested Arctic parties work on reducing governance gaps in the Arctic in three ways: improving limited dialogue and transparency on military issues, updating and providing new skills for the implementation of existing governance agreements, and enabling greater inclusivity in decision-making relevant to the Arctic without questioning the sovereignty of Arctic states. (Center for Global Risk and Security 2022)
Although Arctic states began establishing the Arctic Council in 1996, categorized as a “high-level forum” with a mandate to promote “cooperation among Arctic states, with the participation of Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic residents on common Arctic issues,” today’s conditions in the Arctic differ significantly from those that prevailed after the end of the Cold War when Arctic states initiated a specific regional governance system by launching the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991. (Arctic Council 1996 in: Vasić 2022)
Today, changing climatic, political, and other conditions raise fundamental questions about the adequacy of this vision as a basis for addressing Arctic governance issues emerging in the 2020s. “Arctic natural resource deposits, including large reserves of hydrocarbons, have attracted the attention of policymakers not only in Arctic states but also in countries like China and in multinational companies such as TotalEnergies, ExxonMobil, and Shell. Changes in the political configuration of the international community as a whole have increased tensions between China, Russia, and the US.” (Brigham 2020 in: Vasić 2022) Although the Arctic does not currently represent a location where significant conflicts are likely to occur, the politics of great powers reflect on the Arctic, raising “increasing questions about the status of the Arctic as a peaceful region that is somewhat separated from the main flow of many international affairs.” (Brigham et al. 2020 in: Vasić 2022)
Available literature, interviews, and practice necessary for quality studies on the significance of the Arctic have revealed three key gaps in governance related to the mentioned catalysts: limited dialogue and transparency on military issues, limited capacity to execute governance agreements, and tensions arising from the increasing need for the inclusion of Arctic states in flows. Such gaps do not inherently lead to conflict, but they can provide opportunities or motivation for states to resolve conflicts in ways other than regional cooperation, including military means. To address these shortcomings, interested Arctic parties are focused on improving the currently limited dialogue and transparency on military issues. Furthermore, they are working on updating and providing skills for implementing existing governance agreements, ensuring greater involvement in decision-making relevant to the Arctic without questioning the sovereignty of Arctic states. (Center for Global Risk and Security)
The original article was published on this site in Serbian language in 2022.
